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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 139 
PARTNERSHIPS-PARTNERSHIP BY ESTOPPEL-PROOF OF RELIANC!: BY CRED-
ITOR DEALING WITH PERSONS IN BELIEF OF PARTNERSHIP-Plaintiff tele-
phone company sued to collect for local and long distance telephone serv-
ice rendered through telephone number 196W. Defendant Walter R. 
Lehmann denied liability on the ground that the service was not furnished 
to him but to his son, Wayne R. Lehmann. The telephone was located in 
Wayne's business headquarters, a building on defendant's farm, over which 
hung a sign "W. R. Lehmann & Son-Dairy Cattle." Plaintiff carried the 
telephone in Wayne's .name for fifteen months, until, at Wayne's request, 
the listing was changed to W.R. Lehmann & Son. The change was made 
for the 1953 and 1954 directories, and monthly bills were then mailed to 
W. R. Lehmann & Son. All bills for the first eighteen months after the 
new listing were paid by checks signed by Wayne or his wife. Plaintiff's 
employees believed defendant and Wayne were partners, although in fact 
they were not. The jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, held, reversed. 
Even if it be assumed that defendant was responsible for the misleading 
appearances, plaintiff had not made out a case of partnership by estoppel 
under section 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act,1 since it had not shown 
that it gave credit to defendant's. son only in reliance upon the alleged 
partnership. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Lehmann, (Wis. 1957) 80 N.W. 
(2d) 267. 
The principal case illustrates the difficulties that may arise when a 
creditor seeks to hold a person liable as a partner by estoppel when the 
creditor has previously extended credit to the recipient of goods or services 
as an individual rather than as a partner of the person sought to be helq. 
liable. The difficulty lies in proving that the credit was given "on the 
1 "When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents himself, or 
consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner in an existing partnership 
or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is· liable to any such person to whom 
such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such representation, given 
credit to the actual or apparent partnership. . •. " Wis. Stat. (1953) §123.13. · ' 
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faith of such representation"2 of a partnership. In the more typical case 
where there are no dealings prior to the transaction sued upon, the courts 
require only that the creditor show he believed there was a partnership 
and extended credit in the partnership name.3 The Wisconsin court in 
the principal case and at least two other courts4 have, however, applied 
a more stringent test of reliance where such prior dealings were present. 
The test, as given in the principal case, is a "but-for" causal one: but for 
the alleged partnership with the defendant, would the creditor have fur-
nished goods or services to the recipient as an individual? If so, then he 
cannot be said to have relied to his detriment upon defendant's mis-
representations of partnership and he cannot hold defendant liable by 
estoppel. The apparent theory underlying this test is that prior extension 
of credit to the recipient5 tends to negate the othenvise reasonable assump-
tion that the creditor relied equally upon the financial status of all mem-
bers of ·the alleged partnership. The test limits partnership by estoppel, 
as a theory of recovery after earlier dealings with the recipient, to cases 
in which the creditor can show a refusal, prior to the transaction in ques-
tion, to continue to extend credit to the recipient as an individual. Possible 
bases for a refusal include, e.g., (1) a tightening of the credit policies of 
plaintiff, (2) previously unknown information concerning the recipient's 
2 Uniform Partnership Act, §16. Prior to the Uniform Partnership Act, there were 
two views of the test of liability where defendant did not himself make the misrepresenta-
tions. The minority view held one liable if he knew he was being held out as a partner 
but took no action to prevent the holding out. See Fletcher v. Pullen & Anderson, 70 Md. 
205, 16 A. 887 (1889). The majority view was that defendant must in fact have consented 
to the holding out or he was not liable. The Uniform Partnership Act was intended 
to adopt the majority view. Lewis, "The Uniform Partnership Act," 24 YALE L. J. 617 
(1915). It may be questioned whether it has been accepted as changing the law in Mary-
land, however. See McBriety v. Phillips, 180 Md. 569 at 578, 26 A. (2d) 400 (1942), where 
the Fletcher case is cited with apparent approval. See also 3 Mn. L. REv. 189 (1939). 
Which view is followed in Wisconsin is not ascertainable as the court in the principal 
case, apparently the first in this state to consider §16 of the act, refused to pass on 
the issue. The only Wisconsin case involving partnership :by estoppel which reached the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin prior to the act· was Jenkins v. Davis, 54 Wis. 253, 11 
N.W. 548 (1882), in which the defendant himself made the misrepresentations so that 
this issue did not arise. 
3Flock v. Wpliams, 175 Ill. App. 319 (1912); Look v. Watson & Sons, 117 Me. 476, 
104 A. 850 (1918); McBriety v. Phillips, note I supra; Bissell v. Warde, 129 Mo. 439, 
31 S.W. 928 (1895); Friday v. Rowen & Barton, Ill Ore. 7, 224 P. 632 (1924); C.A. 
Babcock Co. v. Katz, 121 Ore. 64, 253 P. 373 (1927). GILMORE, PARTNERSHIPS 67 (1911): 
" ••• [I]t is not necessary for him to show that he relied solely on the credit of the 
defendant. It is sufficient to charge the defendant if he gave credit to a firm of which 
he believed him to be a partner." The above cases were decided prior to the enactment 
of the UPA in the respective jurisdictions, but there are no later cases to impugn their 
authority. 
4 Elliott v. Floyd, 85 Ga. App. 416, 69 S.E. (2d) 620 (1952) and Yarbrough v. 
Donoghue, Dee & Co., 134 Miss. 578, 99 S. 380 (1924). These were the only other cases 
found by the writer where the opinion revealed there was a record of prior dealings. 
Neither of these cases was decided under the Uniform Partnership Act. 
5 A record of prior dealings with defendant as an individual will, of course, strength-
en plaintiff's assertion of reliance. See Woodward, Faxon & Co. v. Clark, 30 Kan. 78, 
2-- P. 106 (1883). 
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credit rating, or (3) a reversal in the recipient's financial position. This 
test of reliance has the merit of requiring the creditor to show he gave 
some weight to the misrepresentations before he may hold another liable 
for them. It should be noted that it is not altogether clear that the Wis-
consin court intended to restrict this rigorous test of reliance to cases 
involving prior dealings, although this seems the more reasonable inter-
pretation. The ambiguity is heightened by the fact that in the prior lead-
ing Wisconsin decision6 on partnership by estoppel, although the court 
made no discussion of reliance as a necessary element, it noted that plain-
tiffs had testified that they would not have sold to the recipient alone as he 
was irresponsible.7 It is submitted that the doctrine enunciated in the 
principal case should not be extended beyond those cases in which the 
recipient has p:r:eviously been extended credit as an individual. To require 
a creditor to show in every case that the recipient's financial standing did 
not warrant extension of credit to him as an individual would greatly 
reduce the effectiveness of the partnership by estoppel doctrine as a means 
of preventing injustice and allow many defendants to escape liability when 
traditionally they would have been held for their misrepresentations. 
Allen Dewey, S. Ed. 
6 Jenkins v. Davis, note 2 supra. 
7 "The plaintiffs testified positively that they sold the property to and solely on 
the credit of the firm, and that they would not have sold it to Crane alone, because 
he was irresponsible." Jenkins v. Davis, note 2 supra, at 256. 
